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Specialised committees form an important part of the policy-making process in the European 
Union and are key sites for socialising national bureaucrats to accept certain rules and norms 
that institutions of the European Union represent or propagate. Paying attention to the 
socialising potential of such expert committees is especially interesting in the case of new 
modes of governance like the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), the acceptance and 
legitimacy of which is largely contested and debated. This paper focuses on the normative 
socialisation of committee representatives in one OMC committee, the Social Protection 
Committee (SPC). 
  The institutional framework of the OMC has been designed so that committees 
become ‘discursive communities’ (Schmidt 2002, 247), in which member state 
representatives discuss and debate about common normative frameworks, guidelines and 
opinions in specific policy areas. Thus, committees are the main fora for policy co-ordination 
among member state representatives. This process is said to be the basis of both the 
effectiveness and the legitimacy of the OMC (Mosher and Trubek 2003, Zeitlin 2005). On the 
one hand, as the strategy relies on the self-commitment of member states, it is usually argued 
that if discussions of member state representatives are not consensus-oriented, policy learning 
is less likely to occur (Puetter 2006). On the other hand, as committee members represent the 
link between national and European administrations, they play a crucial role in legitimating 
the OMC in the eyes of national bureaucrats who are in charge of policy-making. However, 
these representatives can only do so if they themselves embrace some legitimating principles 
of the OMC. 
  Doubts about the effectiveness of the OMC arose especially after the 2004 
enlargement of the EU, when ten new member states joined the OMC committees. Since 
2007, the number of member state delegates in the SPC is 54. Enlargement can be pictured as 
a cause of potential problems for many reasons, one of them being that due to the lack of 
socialisation of actors from new member states it can become more difficult to reach a real 
consensus in committees (about socialisation and enlargement, see Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2002). Therefore, it is essential to examine whether new committee members 
became socialised into the consensus-oriented nature of committees, or whether there are 
differences between the normative commitments of old and new committee members. 
  The structure of the paper is the following. First, the institutional setup of the OMC 
and the specific case of the social protection and social inclusion policy field are briefly 
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OMC committees and particularly in the SPC. Second, the analytical framework on 
socialisation is outlined. The paper then turns to the empirical analysis, thus to the case study 
of the SPC, where the normative commitments of committee participants (commitments to the 
principles of communication, consensus and learning) are analysed. The final section presents 
the conclusions. 
 
The Open Method of Co-ordination 
 
The OMC was officially launched in 2000 at the Lisbon European Council (European Council 
2000a) in order to define the new mode of governance that emerged with the already existing 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the European Employment Strategy. Later on, the 
OMC was also introduced in other areas, most importantly in connection with social 
inclusion, pensions, and access to health care. These issues make up the so-called streamlined 
social protection and social inclusion agenda. This new method is said to help reaching the 
overarching goal of the Lisbon strategy: ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European Council 2000a). 
In addition, the OMC also forms part of the project of democratising EU decision-
making through participatory governance (de la Porte and Nanz 2004). The involvement of 
‘social partners and civil society’ in the coordination process ‘using variable forms of 
partnership’ is one of the main promises of the method (European Council 2000a). 
Furthermore, the normative anchoring of the OMC is also in its ‘openness’ and ‘flexibility’, 
its focus on ‘cooperation’, and its ability to promote ‘learning’ and ‘greater convergence 
towards the main EU goals’ (European Commission 2003, 8-10). At the same time, the OMC 
allows the EU and its member states to respect ‘diversity’ and the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ 
(European Commission 2003, 10). The European Commission’s White Paper on European 
Governance describes the OMC the following way: 
‘The open method of co-ordination … is a way of encouraging co-operation, the exchange of 
best practice and agreeing common targets and guidelines for Member States, sometimes 
backed up by national action plans as in the case of employment and social exclusion. It relies 
on regular monitoring of progress to meet those targets, allowing Member States to compare 
their efforts and learn from the experience of others’ (European Commission 2001, 21, 
emphasis added). 
 
The institutional setup of the OMC has been designed to help reaching these goals of 
‘learning’ and ‘convergence’.  
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consist of various experts and public officials who continuously and repeatedly co-ordinate 
their actions, ‘interact and exchange ideas and experiences’ in several fora, and ‘exert peer 
pressure on one another’ (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004, 196). The establishment of fora for 
discussion, the most important of which are expert committees
1 that meet regularly, serves to 
enhance a ‘(self-)reflective debate’ (Cohen and Sabel 2003, 346). The goal of committee 
discussions is to reach consensual decisions in areas where policy positions differ 
considerably, without any voting procedure, with every participant (representatives of every 
member state of the EU) ready for compromises and to accept the position of others. 
However, these consensual decisions are not binding for member states in any formal 
sense. Therefore, as Jacobsson (2004, 359) put it: ‘a key issue is how formally non-binding 
agreements can gradually become politically, socially and morally binding for the actors 
involved’. Jacobsson (2004, 356) conceptualises the mechanisms through which this becomes 
possible as being ‘discursive regulatory mechanisms’. She argues that these mechanisms can 
only work if member states are ‘committed to the cooperation procedures’ (Jacobsson 2004, 
366). This commitment was taken for granted before the enlargement. However, this cannot 
be as straightforwardly assumed in the case of new member states. Therefore, it is essential to 
pay attention to socialisation mechanisms and the normative commitments of committee 
members.  
Social protection and social inclusion are among those policy areas where definitions 
of policy problems and ideas about potential solutions are the most diverse and contested. 
There is no clear ‘vision’ about how policies combating social exclusion should look like that 
is shared among the member states (de la Porte and Pochet 2002). Furthermore, social 
protection and social inclusion are ‘politically highly sensitive’ policy areas where the 
competence of the EU has always been questioned (Kröger 2006, 1). Therefore, it is 
particularly important to study the SPC that is responsible for the streamlined social 
protection and social inclusion process. While this committee faces many difficulties in 
agreeing on problem definitions and policy solutions, it is also under pressure to reach 
consensual decisions in order to give visibility to social issues and to justify its existence. 
 
 
                                                 
1 In the cases of social inclusion, pensions and health care (streamlined social protection and social inclusion) the 
main responsible committee is the Social Protection Committee (SPC), for the European Employment Strategy, 
it is the Employment Committee (EMCO), and for economic policy co-ordination, it is the Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC). 
  4Socialisation in committees: the framework for analysis 
 
The assumption that institutions are sites for socialising actors is certainly not new. There are 
even studies that show that committee members who meet on the European level can change 
their loyalties, role perceptions and identities as a result of their participation in committee 
meetings (Egeberg 1999, Egeberg et al. 2003, Trondal 2001, Trondal and Veggeland 2003). 
When studying socialisation, several authors try to distinguish whether actors really 
internalise given norms or simply act according to them (see the distinction between Type I 
and Type II socialisation in Checkel 2005). This paper does not attempt to make this 
distinction, and would even argue that the examination of ‘real’ motivations of actors is not 
relevant in order to reveal how their actions and normative commitments can influence and 
legitimise the work of OMC committees. 
  Thus, instead of focusing on motivations, this paper centres on discursive actions of 
committee participants in order to study their normative commitments to the institution of the 
SPC. Furthermore, though it discusses socialisation, it does not treat institutions as static 
entities, but as ‘living institutions’ (Olsen 2000). This means that through their cooperation, 
actors continuously reinterpret and reconstruct their own institution. Thus, discourse also 
legitimates and interprets institutional arrangements. This interpretation process concerns the 
normative basis of institutional design and the different roles played by relevant actors within 
specific governance structures. This assumption is especially important in the case of such 
ambiguous processes as the OMC. Hajer (2006, 43) defines ‘institutional ambiguity’ the 
following way: ‘there is no single “constitution” that pre-determines where and how a 
legitimate decision is to be taken. Actors bring their own assumptions about rules and 
authority. Consequently, the policy process itself becomes the site at which rules need to be 
negotiated’. This implies that this negotiation process itself is crucial in bringing about shared 
notions of rules, authority, and legitimacy. The participation of actors within an institutional 
context shape and construct that context but at the same time, the experience of cooperation 
transforms the actors themselves (Hajer and Versteeg 2005, Olsen 2000).  
  As it was mentioned above, this paper aims to study the individual commitments of 
actors to cooperation procedures. Thus, the concept of ‘socialisation’ here refers to a process 
of interaction through which actors embrace similar normative principles as bases of their 
actions in a given institutional setting. In order to judge these commitments, it is essential to 
see how this institutional setting is perceived and communicated and how modes of 
interaction shape the role perception and normative standpoints of actors. As the arguments 
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representatives being socialised into the OMC – the legitimacy and effectiveness of the OMC 
can weaken. 
  Due to the assumption of institutional ambiguity, the paper does not deal with pre-
given principles of legitimacy or institutional norms that should be followed by old and new 
participants, though, as it will be shown, the principles described by interviewees partly 
reflect the ‘official’ definition of the OMC. In the absence of presumptions about the work of 
OMC committees, the first task is to identify the most important normative commitments 
based on interviews with committee delegates. Nevertheless, as many studies argue for the 
need for an existing commitment to consensus-seeking in committee meetings (see above) 
and interviews indeed show that this principle is important for committee members, 
consensus-seeking attitudes are given special attention in the analysis. 
The next section compares some normative statements of different groups of 
committee representatives to see whether old and new actors perceive the SPC in similar or 
diverse ways. There are three main groups of participants that are distinguished: 
representatives from old member states who participate in SPC meetings from the beginning, 
delegates from old member states who became members after the enlargement (they can also 
be regarded as ‘new’ members of the SPC), and finally, new member state representatives. 
Based on this comparison through discourse analysis, conclusions can be drawn about the 
socialisation of different members of the committee. 
 
Normative commitments or how the Social Protection Committee should work 
 
After presenting some basic information on the SPC, this section analyses the main arguments 
of selected members of the SPC about values based on which the committee does or should 
work. All empirical material and citations that are referred to in this section are from semi-
structured, anonymous interviews
2 with member state representatives of the SPC. The 
interviews are assumed to be discursive actions themselves, as interviewees can use them ‘as 
a political instrument to further their views and goals’ (Barbier 2004, 19). This means that the 
                                                 
2 This preliminary empirical analysis is based on 12 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with member state 
representatives of the SPC. Among the 12 interviewees from member state administrations 4 is from new 
member countries, 5 has been a member of the SPC since its creation, and 3 is from old member states who 
became representatives after the enlargement. The interviews were conducted in the first half of 2006. Interview 
transcripts were numbered randomly, and the interviewees are quoted according to these numbers. 
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their institutional action.  
 
The Social Protection Committee 
The SPC was established in 2000 (Council of the European Union 2000; re-established by 
Council of the European Union 2004), after the Nice European Council launched the Social 
Inclusion Process (European Council 2000b). The committee has four broad objectives: ‘to 
make work pay and provide secure income, to make pensions safe and pension systems 
sustainable, to promote social inclusion and to ensure high quality and sustainable health care’ 
(Council of the European Union 2004). One of the main tasks of the SPC is ‘to prepare 
reports, formulate opinions or undertake other work within its fields of competence, at the 
request of either the Council or the Commission or on its own initiative’ (Council of the 
European Union 2004). 
Members of the SPC are representatives from the member states – in principle, two 
delegates from national ministries with two alternates if the member state is able to send this 
many people – and two representatives of the European Commission. The committee elects its 
chairperson from among the representatives for two years, which term is non-renewable. The 
chair is responsible for setting the agenda for SPC meetings. This person is assisted by a 
‘bureau’ that consists of Commission representatives and four vice-chairpersons, two of 
whom are elected for two years, one is from the country holding the Presidency of the 
Council, and one is from the country of the following Presidency. The European Commission 
appoints a so-called secretary of the committee and provides organisational support for the 
SPC (Council of the European Union 2004). 
 
In the following paragraphs, normative commitments of some delegates of the SPC are 
discussed. However, before the analysis, it has to be noted that only those principles are 
examined here that are, first, related to the effective work of the committee, and second, 
relevant in understanding the differences in emphases and approaches between old and new 
members of the SPC. These main principles that were chosen based on the interviews are the 
following. First, the SPC should work like a forum for discussion where the exchange of 
opinions is possible (commitment to communication). Second, a tradition of consensus-
seeking should be maintained (commitment to consensus). Finally, the policy coordination 
process should result in some kind of learning (commitment to learning). This certainly means 
that the list of legitimating features of the OMC presented here is exclusive – even such 
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left out. Furthermore, it is important to mention here that the differences between certain 
groups of interviewees are rarely sharp and there are exceptions in most cases. Thus, the 
findings can only be very cautiously generalised (if at all), especially based on the limited 
available information. 
 
Commitment to communication: the SPC as a forum 
The most widely accepted advantage of the OMC and the SPC in particular is that it is a 
‘valuable place of exchanging opinions’ (Interviewee no. 6). Thus, the SPC is said to provide 
a ‘forum for discussion’ on a European level about social issues (Interviewee no. 9, 11). This 
forum is the main meeting point for representatives coming from certain national ministries. It 
is a place for ‘networking’ (Interviewee no. 6), to ‘make contacts’ (Interviewee no. 11), and to 
get to ‘know the other stakeholders in Europe and to get used to them’ (Interviewee no. 9). To 
quote one of the delegates: 
‘The SPC is a concrete way to legitimately have common discussions; which is not 
completely evident from a national point of view; the fact that the German can discuss with 
the French or the French with the Polish and so on, with the Greek and so on, on what could 
be considered as very national topics’ (Interviewee no. 1). 
 
Having meetings once a month allows delegates to have ‘quite in-depth discussions’ and to 
hear ‘the position of different member states’ (Interviewee no. 2). An essential feature of 
these discussions is that ‘everybody has an opportunity to be involved’; as without such a 
‘formalised’ coordination process only bilateral discussions would be possible and potentially 
not at the time when a country needs it (Interviewee no. 11). 
  The goal of committee discussions is ‘sharing information’ and ‘sharing experiences 
with other member states’ (Interviewee no. 7). This is especially interesting as the position of 
member states differs in many policy issues: ‘we may not always agree, but we’d still talk to 
each other to try and find out what our position is about and try and understand what is there 
to say’ (Interviewee no. 7). Sharing information and best practices can lead to the recognition 
that ‘we’re not the only one with problems in this matter’ (Interviewee no. 9). Moreover, as 
one of the delegates put it: 
‘it’s important to bring us together once a month for the SPC meeting, because then you see 
other member states’ positions, sometimes you may discuss them more in detail, and then you 
may sometimes also adjust your positions and get other views’ (Interviewee no. 2). 
 
Thus, this ‘circulation of ideas’ (Interviewee no. 1) can also bring about changes in the way of 
thinking about particular problems in particular countries and ultimately, can lead to the 
‘sharing of goals’ (Interviewee no. 1) and even to ‘solving problems together’ (Interviewee 
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member states, delegates present ‘reasonable’ arguments (Interviewee no. 6): ‘everyone is in 
the business of convincing others’ (Interviewee no. 3). As one of the interviewees explained: 
‘It’s not as if people are reading set pieces, they’re listening to what other people are saying, 
it’s a real debate, and it’s very important that it’d be that way’ (Interviewee no. 3). 
  The description of the SPC’s ideal way of working as a forum for discussion was there 
in all interviews and was valued positively in all cases. Nevertheless, there is certainly a 
difference between those who communicate that the SPC works like such a forum and those 
who think that the SPC should work according to this principle, but at present does not fulfil 
the requirements. The answers of delegates vary from the most positive through ambiguous to 
the most critical with the oldest members being on the positive side. New members of the 
SPC, no matter what country they come from, tend to be more critical about the actual work 
of the committee. However, the most critical attitude was that of a relatively old member of 
the SPC, but her answers should be treated cautiously as she was not coming from a national 
ministry but was an external expert. In her formulation: ‘the delegates of the committee 
appear to be less involved in real exchange and decision-making; this seems to be more in the 
hands of the functionaries of the permanent representations in Brussels (Interviewee no. 10). 
In other words, member states just talk, while the Commission, ‘like a tank’, pushes through 
documents (Interviewee no. 10). 
  There is also another difference between representatives, in this case between the ones 
coming from old and others from new member states. All interviewees somehow regarded the 
SPC as a link between national administrations, the Council of Ministers, and the European 
Commission. However, the perspectives differ. Some delegates coming from new member 
states mentioned an additional feature of the SPC as a forum that links different levels of 
policy-making. For them, the SPC is not only helpful because people who represent ministers 
can come together and discuss common problems – and those problems can become 
‘European’ – but also because it is a forum that can ‘communicate easily with the ministers’ 
and can send ‘messages back’ to national ministries about what is going on at the European 
level (Interviewee no. 5). The best illustration for this attitude is the following quote: ‘you 
have to know what’s happening, because you have to know if you’re working like I am 
working on the European Union matters, you have to know what’s happening at the European 
level’ (Interviewee no. 8). This top-down perspective of talking about ‘Europe’ as something 
that should be accepted or known but not necessarily constituted will be discussed in relation 
to the principle consensus-seeking as well. 
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Commitment to consensus-seeking: maintaining the tradition 
Most delegates emphasised that the SPC is not only a forum, but a forum with a special aim of 
reaching consensual decisions and common opinions. The OMC is regarded as a ‘consensual 
process’ in which all ‘views are taken into account’ (Interviewee no. 3). Such consensus 
should be ‘recognised’ by all the delegates and the Commission without any voting 
procedure.
3 Within the committee, ‘everybody accepts the need to compromise’ (Interviewee 
no. 7) and everybody should accept that the objective is to ‘get a consensus, achieve and 
maintain the kind of tradition of consensus on issues, [and] listen to the range of views’ 
(Interviewee no. 3, emphasis added). 
As most representatives agree, reaching such consensus – or compromise – is certainly 
not easy, as the starting points of member states are different: ‘there are some fairly different 
viewpoints within the committee, but we still nevertheless enter our consensus’ (Interviewee 
no. 7). Or in a different formulation: 
‘normally we try and thresh it out till we get something which sometimes a compromise, 
where, you know, the opposing sides can live with it, sometimes we can change some 
procedural things so that’s right, sometimes we come back and gain an agreement later’ 
(Interviewee no. 4) 
 
The consensus or agreement that is reached in the end allows member states ‘to identify 
common objectives’ (Interviewee no. 3), as the ultimate goal is ‘to have a common view’ 
(Interviewee no. 2) on certain important issues and ‘a mutually acceptable outcome’ 
(Interviewee no. 3). 
  Again, the consensual nature of the OMC and the need to find a compromise between 
member states was accepted by all interviewees. Certainly, differences in accents occur, 
especially in two respects: first, in giving reasons why such consensus is necessary (including 
the reference to the visibility of social issues), and second, in evaluating the role of the 
Commission and the chair of the SPC. These differences are discussed in turn. 
For most delegates, having a common view as a result of a consensual process is 
important, ‘because the SPC also communicates’, so achieving a ‘common SPC document’ is 
vital in order to make the voices of member state representatives heard in the Council and in 
different fora (Interviewee no. 2). Here lies the ‘political’ nature of the committee: in order to 
influence the Council, a consensus or a compromise should be presented that reflects the 
opinion of all member states (Interviewee no. 8). In general, nevertheless, old members of the 
                                                 
3 Quoting Interviewee no. 3: ‘We’ve never had a vote at SPC; never ever had to have a vote. People just 
recognise a consensus (…). We’ve never failed in the 6 years to agree on a document’. 
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for a compromise or consensus (mostly compromise in their formulation) less frequently and 
often without giving any reasons why it is so important. Furthermore, new members of the 
committee, especially coming from old member states appear to be more critical about this 
consensus-seeking tradition: ‘as long as competences are mainly based in member states, it’s 
necessary to find a compromise; otherwise the reaction would be very negative (...) if a big 
member state (…) felt neglected or just overruled’ (Interviewee no. 9). They seem to be less 
attached to the SPC and emphasise instead much more their loyalty to their respective 
government or ministry. 
The visibility of social issues on the European level is a specific reason linked to the 
need for consensus. Interviews suggest that an important feature that can legitimate the OMC 
in social policy-related fields is that through this process, ‘social policy and social questions 
[are put] more highly on the agenda’ (Interviewee no 11). Several delegates argued that ‘it’s 
necessary to give social policy some place to discuss in Europe’ (Interviewee no. 9) in order 
to counterbalance economic policy harmonisation and coordination. For some – mostly for 
old members of the committee – the visibility of the ‘social dimension’ is important on its 
own (Interviewee no 2). Others took a more pragmatic approach and argued that ‘for Europe 
it is important not to neglect the social policy, because it’s closely related with reputation and 
its legitimacy (…); if it’s only about market and competition, then (…) people [might] say 
that “we don’t like this kind of Europe”’ (Interviewee no. 9). In other words, the social 
dimension should be taken up at European level, as ‘Europe needs it and people want to hear 
it’ (Interviewee no 3). Interestingly, using the visibility of social issues as a potential 
argument for legitimating the OMC is completely missing from the interviews of delegates 
coming from new member states. This can be due to their lack of ‘historical’ perspective on 
the SPC and the OMC
4. 
A further difference that can be observed is that the top-down perspective discussed 
above appears again in the case of some delegates coming from new member states. As one of 
them said, ‘it’s important to get to the ministers a clear message understood by the whole 
committee’ (Interviewee no. 5). Or else: ‘it’s very interesting how it is possible to find a 
compromise for all countries; it’s very difficult from the Commission’s side I think (…) the 
Commission has to find the best solution for all the member states’ (Interviewee no. 12). 
These quotes show that the interviewee her- or himself, as a supposed-to-be voice of minister 
assumes to play a less active role in finding a consensus or a compromise. 
                                                 
4 As a delegate from a new member state put it: ‘we got on when the committee was running and no-one really 
explained to us what was the role of the committee and how it functions’ (Interviewee no. 6). 
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the role of the Commission and the chair of the SPC. In the case of old members, the 
Commission and the chair appear to be neutral facilitators of getting a consensual view: a 
consensus is reached ‘with the help of the Commission, with the help of the secretariat and the 
chair’ (Interviewee no. 7). The role of the chair is especially vital; as one of the interviewees 
put it: ‘one of the reasons why we have the current chair is because if he as an ordinary 
member (…) practices as a voice of compromise suggesting ways to go about, that’s one of 
the reasons why he was elected as chairman’ (Interviewee no. 7). The role of the chair in 
maintaining the tradition of consensus is acknowledged even more explicitly by a delegate 
from a new member state: ‘the Social Protection Committee, as [the chair] said himself, it’s a 
political thing, and you are looking for a compromise’ and ‘when there was a conflict [the 
chair] explained to us that this is different from other meetings, this is a political meeting as 
well’ (Interviewee no. 8). These quotes also reflect the socialisation process of the SPC, as the 
interviewee referred to statements of the chair about the importance and the consensual nature 
of discussions. Thus, in these cases, normative principles appear as phrases mentioned by 
someone else – even if this someone else is an authoritative member of the committee. 
The role of the Commission is judged in a more controversial manner. As it was 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, in the interviews with old members of the SPC, the 
Commission, along with the chair, is a relatively passive facilitator of consensual decisions
5. 
In contrast, in the case of new members of the committee, the Commission is said to play a 
much more active role, which is judged either negatively (in the case of most delegates from 
old member states) or neutrally or positively (in the case of new member state 
representatives). New member state representatives refer to the Commission as having a role 
in finding the ‘best solution for all the member states’ (Interviewee no. 12), or find it 
important that in the SPC they can find out ‘how the Commission would like to do’ things 
(Interviewee no. 5), or even describe the coordination process as a useful tool for the 
Commission ‘to look how the member states are performing and how the member states are 
reforming their policies’ (Interviewee no. 5). 
 
Commitment to learning: widening horizons 
As ‘learning’ is often mentioned as a desired end-state of policy coordination, it also has to be 
discussed here. Attitudes of delegates towards learning influence their normative positions 
                                                 
5 With the exception of the external expert member of the SPC, who described the Commission as a ‘tank’ that 
gets its views across. 
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the OMC in national ministries. 
  The most widespread understanding of ‘learning’ is basically sharing information, 
widening horizons and learning about how other countries solve certain problems without 
actually mentioning potential policy results: ‘the goal is making this (…) not in order to 
negotiate or influence more, but in order to learn more. Because here we have, it’s a European 
network, so we could be more aware of what is at stake and how it works in the other 
countries’ (Interviewee no. 1).  Or, as another delegate put it: ‘one of their clear benefits 
would be if member states were looking for comparisons to see how other countries were 
doing and therefore learning lessons from them’ (Interviewee no. 4). A specific perspective of 
new member states can be seen from the following quote: ‘definitely we understand more 
different countries, especially I think the old member states understand more about the new 
member states right now than they used to a year ago or a year and a half ago’ (Interviewee 
no. 6). This type of understanding of learning can be found in most interviews that discuss 
learning as an important feature of the OMC in any way, no matter from which country the 
interviewee came from. Nevertheless, it has to be noted here that most delegates coming from 
old member states did not even mention learning throughout the interviews, and one new 
member from an old member state even talked about it with a negative tone. 
  Knowing this absence of commitment to learning in the case of old member state 
delegates, it is not surprising that the most important difference between representatives is 
that all interviewees who talked about effective outcomes as results of a learning process were 
from new member states (with the exception of the chair of the SPC
6, but that is a somewhat 
specific case). New member state delegates emphasised that it is important ‘to get the 
experience from the other countries, and maybe to take in our legislation some ideas’ 
(Interviewee no. 12). Or else, a representative from a new member state claimed that: ‘for us 
it’s interesting how Ireland is working with child poverty, or for example Netherlands is 
trying to liberalise the services especially in the area of employment services; and trying to 
sort of look at it and think about it how to incorporate it into [our] systems’ (Interviewee no. 
5). 
  There exists a third formulation of learning, but it can solely be found in answers of 
the chair of the SPC. This understanding of learning refers to the ‘moral influence’ of Europe, 
thus the ability of Europe to influence the ‘priorities’ of member states ‘without (…) being 
                                                 
6 As he put it:  ‘at the end of the day, that’s the only point of doing it, to have an effective outcome for people at 
national level’. 
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of the OMC. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The above analysis studied the main normative commitments of old and new committee 
members to cooperation procedures. It distinguished three main principles expressed by 
interviewees based on which the SPC should work – the principle of communication, the 
principle of consensus and the principle of learning – and examined the different 
understandings of and commitments to these principles. The role of this final section is to 
draw some conclusions about the normative socialisation of committee members based on the 
above findings. Again, the present study is not interested in the specific motivations of 
different actors. Instead, it analysed whether delegates acknowledge that discussions and 
consensus-seeking are the appropriate and ‘the legitimate ways of reaching decisions’ 
(Egeberg 1999, 460, emphasis original) and that learning is among the legitimate goals of the 
OMC. This acknowledgement or acceptance does not necessarily mean internalisation; it only 
concerns the actors’ recognition that the SPC operates in certain ways, which needs to be 
communicated. 
  The analysis does not support initial expectations about the lack of socialisation of 
new member state representatives. Though to different degrees, but all interviewees accepted 
that the SPC works on the basis of ongoing discussions and consensus-seeking. Furthermore, 
it was not delegates from new member states that were the most critical about these principles 
of cooperation and their realisation in the SPC, but those coming from old member states who 
became committee members after the enlargement. Certainly, representatives with different 
backgrounds had different perspectives on communication and consensus and about their own 
role in achieving these. In general, delegates from new member states showed a more passive 
attitude towards consensus-seeking, relying on the active participation of the Commission 
much more. This can also be seen from a more top-down perspective on communication and 
the emphasis on getting information coming from the European level. 
  Thus, the analysis suggests that the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the OMC are 
not undermined because of the lack of consensus-orientation of new committee members. 
Nevertheless, one has to be aware that without being able to give reasons why such a 
consensus is important, this principle can be only an empty phrase instead of a clear value to 
follow. In this context, it seems to be a rather crucial difference that the socialisation process 
  14of delegates from old member states started when debates on the OMC were more heightened, 
whereas representatives from new member states simply had to accept the existence of such a 
coordination process. 
  Another important finding of the present paper is about commitments to learning as a 
desired end-state of the policy process. Undoubtedly, it makes a difference if a member state 
representative attends committee meetings to gain more information or with a more or less 
clear reform-agenda in mind. From the interviews it seems that the OMC is much more about 
learning in the sense of changing policies for new member state delegates than for old ones, 
which is interesting considering the fact that learning became a keyword in describing the 
OMC in many studies and official documents. This eagerness to learn from the side of new 
member states representatives can be attributed to a greater influence of the Commission 
within the socialisation process, but the present analysis certainly cannot confirm this 
presumption. What appears from the interviews, nevertheless – as it was already mentioned 
above – is that delegates from new member states indeed regard the Commission as playing 
an active and significant role within the SPC.  
  A next step in future research can be to look at how these different understandings, 
commitments and role perceptions – thus the process of socialisation – influence the outcomes 
of the policy process. Additionally, more interviews should be conducted, which can make it 
possible to generalise the findings to a greater extent, and to answer new questions about the 
differences between perceptions that arose during this study. 
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